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Crimes are typically defined in terms of discrete instances of
conduct. Criminal trials are therefore limited in scope. Juries are
charged not with determining whether a defendant is generally
immoral or dangerous, but rather whether he committed a
particular criminal act. In short, we try a defendant “for what he
1
did, not for who he is.” The character evidence rule reflects that
† Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
1. United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977); accord United
States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d
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focus. The rule, developed at common law and codified into Rule
404, states that evidence of a defendant’s acts of uncharged
2
misconduct is inadmissible to show his bad character.
But the character evidence rule does not categorically ban
evidence of other misconduct. Rule 404(b) allows evidence of
uncharged misconduct to be admitted for “other purposes”—i.e.,
non-character purposes—such as motive, intent, plan, and
3
identity. In Minnesota, evidence offered for such a purpose is
known as Spreigl evidence after the eponymous 1965 Minnesota
4
Supreme Court decision. (In most jurisdictions, it is known simply
as 404(b) evidence.)
Applying Rule 404(b) is often difficult because the line
between permissible non-character uses and impermissible
character uses of other misconduct evidence is often subtle.
Evidence law commentators have often criticized courts for failing
5
to draw the line with enough care. Wigmore himself thought it
“hopeless to attempt to reconcile the precedents under various
6
heads.” Others have been more ambitious. Just this year, as part
of the New Wigmore treatise, David Leonard published an entire
volume devoted solely to the 404(b) problem of drawing the line
between permissible and impermissible uses of uncharged
7
misconduct evidence. Edward Imwinkelried previously published
8
a two-volume treatise devoted mostly to the same question. The
1067, 1073 n.10 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Vance, 871 F.2d 572, 575 (6th
Cir. 1989); State v. Prioleau, 664 A.2d 743, 771 (Conn. 1995); State v. Sullivan, 679
N.W.2d 19, 23 (Iowa 2004); State v. Yager, 461 N.W.2d 741, 752 (Neb. 1990).
2. FED. R. EVID. 404.
3. Id. at 404(b).
4. State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965).
5. 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 4:28 (3d ed. 2008) (“Perhaps because the issue so inundates courts hearing
criminal appeals, published opinions often give it but passing mention, and it is
lamentably common to see recitations of laundry lists of permissive uses, with little
analysis or attention to the particulars.”); 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404.20[3] (2nd ed. 1997) (“[C]ourts on
occasion have admitted other-acts evidence almost automatically, without any real
analysis, if they find it fits within one of the categories specified in Rule 404(b).”);
22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE – EVIDENCE § 5239 (“Yet despite the recurrence of the issues, the
[appellate] opinions are often poorly reasoned and provide little guidance to trial
judges.”) (footnote omitted).
6. 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 302, at 246 (Chadborne rev. ed. 1979).
7. DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENCE OF OTHER MISCONDUCT
AND SIMILAR EVENTS (2009) [hereinafter NEW WIGMORE].
8. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (2006).
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mass of those accomplished works demonstrates both the
importance and the difficulty of the legal problem.
Without question, there is room for disagreement about
particular applications of Rule 404(b). In cases around the hazy
line between permissible and impermissible uses, reasonable jurists
can disagree. But the case law in Minnesota and elsewhere suggests
a disagreement not just about particular applications but also about
the underlying principle itself—about what counts as a permissible
use, about the propriety of the propensity inference itself.
The traditional view of Rule 404(b) is that it bars propensity
reasoning but allows the use of uncharged misconduct for nonpropensity purposes.
Thus, when evidence of uncharged
misconduct is offered for one of the other 404(b) purposes, its
relevance must not depend on propensity. In other words, when a
prosecutor offers evidence of a defendant’s other crimes, it is not
enough for her to show that the evidence demonstrates his motive,
intent, identity, or plan—rather, she must show that the evidence
demonstrates his motive, intent, identity or plan through some
chain of inferences that does not include the propensity inference.
That traditional view is uniformly endorsed by evidence law
9
treatises. It is also widely recognized by the casebooks used in law
10
school evidence classes.
The case law, however, is far less clear. Many courts recognize
11
(and at least attempt to apply) the traditional view. Others courts
9. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, § 2.19 (“[T]he act must have independent,
legitimate, or special relevance on another [non-propensity] theory.”) (footnotes
omitted); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, § 4:28 (“[S]uch proof offered is
not saved from the principle of exclusion by the mere fact that it supports a
specific inference to a point like intent if the necessary logical steps include an
inference of general character or propensity, or if it seems likely that the proof will
be used to support such an inference.”); 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 404.02[9] (8th ed. 2002); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 5, § 5239 (“[T]he rule admits evidence of other crimes whenever it is
relevant without using the inference of character anywhere in the chain of
inference.”). But see Andrew J. Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious
Ban on Character Reasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181 (1998)
(arguing that the purported propensity ban cannot be squared with the case law).
10. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 147–50 (2d ed. 2008); ERIC D. GREEN ET
AL., PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 181–82 (3d ed. 2000); RICHARD
O. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 331 (3d ed. 2000); DAVID P.
LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 355 (2d ed. 2007).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 118 (1st Cir. 2000)
(“[T]he evidence must have special relevance to an issue in the case such as intent
or knowledge, and must not include bad character or propensity as a necessary
link in the inferential chain.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States
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reject the traditional view of Rule 404(b), at least implicitly. They
routinely admit evidence whose relevance depends primarily on
propensity so long as it ultimately goes to prove one of the listed
“other purposes” in 404(b). Minnesota courts fall in the latter
camp. In general, they do not closely scrutinize the precise chain
of inferences that supports the relevance of Spreigl evidence, and
under various broad doctrines of admissibility, they regularly admit
12
evidence whose sole or primary relevance depends on propensity.
To be sure, Minnesota courts are not in any legal sense
obligated to follow the traditional view. As a textual matter, Rule
404(b) itself does not unambiguously endorse the traditional view.
As a historical matter, the traditional view was never uniformly
endorsed by the case law prior to the rule’s enactment, and the
drafters of the rule made no effort to settle the well-known
contradictions of their contemporaneous case law. As a doctrinal
matter, Minnesota’s rejection of the traditional view finds ample
support both in its own case law and in the case law of the many
other courts around the country. The only authority with which
the Spreigl doctrine squarely conflicts is the authority of evidence
law treatises, which are ultimately only worth the weight they are
given by courts—in this case, not much.
Still, even if it is in some sense justified by other legal
authority, the Spreigl doctrine fails as a matter of logic. If the
traditional view of Rule 404(b) is rejected, then the character
evidence rule itself is meaningless. If propensity reasoning is
allowed to prove the other 404(b) purposes, then the character
evidence rule amounts to almost nothing, and it should simply be
abandoned.

v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen evidence of prior bad
acts is offered, the proponent must clearly articulate how that evidence fits into a
chain of logical inferences, no link of which may be the inference that the
defendant has the propensity to commit the crime charged.”); Bradbury v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 815 F.2d 1356, 1365 (10th Cir. 1987) (“The proper approach is
not simply to find a ‘pigeon hole’ in which the proof might fit, but to determine
whether the evidence proves something other than propensity . . . .”); People v.
Crawford, 582 N.W.2d 785, 791 (Mich. 1998) (“[A] common pitfall in MRE
404(b) cases is the trial courts’ tendency to admit the prior misconduct evidence
merely because it has been ‘offered’ for one of the rule’s enumerated proper
purposes.”); State v. McManus, 594 N.W.2d 623, 629 (Neb. 1999) (“Evidence that
is offered for a proper purpose is often referred to as having ‘special’ or
‘independent relevance,’ which means its relevance does not depend on its
tendency to show propensity.”).
12. See infra Part II.
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As a policy matter, a good case can be made for outright
repeal.
In any event, there is no point in maintaining a
meaningless rule (or a rule that courts refuse to enforce).
Conversely, if the rule is worth having, then it is also worth
enforcing in a meaningful way, and the only meaningful way to
enforce the rule is to embrace and attempt to apply the traditional
view barring the propensity inference. Either outcome could be
justified as a matter of logic and as a matter of policy. What cannot
be justified as a matter of logic or policy is the current Spreigl
doctrine, which only pretends to enforce some sort of ill-defined
prohibition on character evidence.
This article first examines how Minnesota’s character evidence
doctrine developed, with a particular focus on the historical
13
confusion regarding the propriety of the propensity inference. It
then examines current case law and argues that Minnesota’s
14
current Spreigl doctrine routinely allows propensity evidence. It
finally proposes a choice between abandoning the current Spreigl
15
doctrine and repealing the character rule itself. I take no position
on which alternative should be chosen, but either is better than the
status quo. The current doctrine in Minnesota is a Potemkin
village.
I.

THE PAST: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPREIGL DOCTRINE IN
MINNESOTA
16

It is often said that the character evidence rule is in decline.
That is true so far as it goes, but it leaves the false impression of
some past golden age when the character evidence rule was well
understood and rigorously enforced by courts. In fact, the history
of the rule in Minnesota and elsewhere is a history of substantial
confusion. The rationale for the rule has shifted over time, and the
rule itself has been enforced inconsistently throughout its history.
That legacy of confusion helps to explain the current Spreigl
doctrine and its unprincipled approach to propensity evidence.
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the Character
Evidence Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance, The
Doctrine of Chances, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 419, 423 (2006) (“Paradoxically, in the past
decade, the tables have turned. The character evidence prohibition is no longer
considered sacrosanct.”).
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The confusion about the rule’s scope is in part a function of
confusion about the rule’s rationale. The modern rationale of the
character evidence rule is that evidence of a defendant’s prior
crimes will lead the jury to convict on improper grounds. In
Wigmore’s famous articulation of the rationale:
The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal—
whether judge or jury—is to give excessive weight to the
vicious record of the crime thus exhibited, and either to
allow it to bear to strongly on the present charge, or to
take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation
17
irrespective of guilt of the present charge.
The United States Supreme Court echoed those concerns
more recently in Old Chief:
Such improper grounds certainly include the one that
[the defendant] points to here: generalizing a
defendant’s earlier bad act into bad character and taking
that as raising the odds that he did the later bad act now
charged (or, worse, as calling for preventive conviction
even if he should happen to be innocent momentarily).
As then-Judge Breyer put it, “Although . . . ‘propensity
evidence’ is relevant, the risk that a jury will convict for
crimes other than those charged—or that, uncertain of
guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person deserves
punishment—creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs
18
ordinary relevance.”
As both Wigmore and Old Chief suggest, there are in fact two
distinct rationales—two distinct types of unfair prejudice that
character evidence might produce. The first risk has to do with the
propensity inference itself. The inference from propensity is that
because a defendant committed crimes in the past, it is more likely
that he committed the charged crime as well. In other words,
“because someone was a bad guy once, he is likely to be a bad guy
19
The propensity inference meets the standards of
again.”
relevance, but there is a risk that jurors will give it more weight
than it deserves.
The second risk has nothing to do with the propensity
inference. Rather, the second rationale relates to nullification and
17. 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF
AT COMMON LAW § 194, at 233 (1904).

EVIDENCE IN TRIALS

18. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180–81 (1997) (quoting United
States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir 1982)).
19. United States v. McCourt, 925 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1991).
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preventative conviction. The concern is that if jurors know of a
defendant’s prior crimes, they will return a verdict of guilty even if
they do not conclude that the defendant committed the presently
charged offense. If the jurors reason that way, they do not rely on
the propensity inference from past crimes to current crimes—
rather, they convict on past crimes alone.
As in Old Chief, courts often treat the two rationales as
overlapping and even indistinct. But the two rationales are
different, and importantly so. Ultimately, the scope of the
character evidence rule is mostly a function of the first rationale.
The scope of the character evidence rule depends on the extent to
which the propensity inference is allowed.
On that point, as I will discuss below, the current law in
Minnesota (as in many jurisdictions) is muddled. The current
confusion, however, is nothing new or recent. The common law
character evidence rule that prevailed prior to the enactment of
the Rules of Evidence was muddled. At times, Minnesota courts
barred evidence of uncharged misconduct regardless of whether
the propensity inference was involved, and at other times,
Minnesota courts explicitly endorsed propensity reasoning. Those
dueling strands of reasoning were never conclusively resolved by
the case law, nor were they resolved by the enactment of Rule 404
itself. It is that history of confusion that explains the current
problems with the doctrine.
A. Earliest Minnesota Cases – A Blunt, Categorical Rule
The character evidence rule began to develop in England
20
The rule was originally
during the late seventeenth century.
justified not by the modern rationales of unfair prejudice but
21
rather by concerns regarding relevance and surprise. At least into
the early eighteenth century, the rule was enforced only
22
sporadically and subject to substantial exceptions. Thus, at the
time when American jurisdictions imported the character evidence
rule, it was relatively recent and somewhat uncertain in scope.
By the mid-nineteenth century, when Minnesota became a
state and its court system began operation, the rule had solidified
20. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 190–95
(2003); Thomas J. Reed, Trial By Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Act Evidence
in Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 716–18 (1981).
21. LANGBEIN, supra note 20, at 191.
22. Id. at 202–03.
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somewhat in American law. Nineteenth- century Minnesota cases
appeared to state the rule in a fairly strong form, but also in an
inchoate form, with an indefinite scope and rationale.
The earliest published Minnesota case dealing with the rule
23
was probably Hoberg v. State, decided in 1859, one year after
Minnesota was admitted to the union. Hoberg was charged with
theft, which was proven in part by evidence that the stolen goods
24
were found in his house. In the course of its case, the prosecution
also presented evidence that some dresses were also discovered
25
Hoberg’s daughter testified that the dresses were not
there.
stolen, and perhaps in rebuttal, the prosecution called a witness to
26
testify that the dresses had been stolen from his clothes line. The
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the admission of the rebuttal
27
testimony was error that entitled Hoberg to a new trial. The court
held:
These last statements, as before observed, were far beyond
what the prosecution proposed to prove by the witness,
and were well calculated to prejudice the prisoner in the
minds of the jury. The State should not have been
permitted, on the pretense of discrediting the witness, by
impeaching her on a matter immaterial to the issue, to
prove a distinct felony not charged in the indictment. We
can scarcely conceive of any testimony more likely to have
28
had an injurious effect upon the minds of the jury.
The Hoberg ruling said nothing further about the scope of the
rule or its rationale. It stood for the general proposition that
evidence of uncharged crimes was prejudicial and “injurious,” but
29
it did not specify why.
A decade later, the court once again applied the rule in a
30
surprisingly strong form in State v. Hoyt. Hoyt was charged with
killing Stamford, and Stamford’s wife testified that on the day of
31
and the day after the alleged murder, Hoyt had also assaulted her.
The court ruled that it was error to admit evidence of the other

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

3 Minn. 181 (1859).
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 184.
Id.
13 Minn. 125 (1868).
Id. at 127.
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assault because it “had no tendency to establish the charge
contained in the indictment, and its natural effect was to prejudice
32
the jury against the defendant.”
To modern eyes, that conclusion looks far too strong. The
court suggested that the evidence was irrelevant to the charged
offense, but certainly evidence that Hoyt assaulted Stamford’s wife
at least made it somewhat more likely that he also killed Stamford.
Indeed, the evidence was likely relevant for both non-propensity
33
and propensity reasons. But the court deemed it both irrelevant
and prejudicial. Again, as in Hoberg, the court did not discuss the
nature of the prejudice.
34
In 1898 in State v. Austin, a saloon owner was accused of
selling liquor to minors. He testified in his own defense that he
35
In rebuttal, the prosecution
had never sold liquor to minors.
36
called witnesses who had seen him selling liquor to minors. The
English common law character evidence rule, like the modern
rules, allowed the prosecution to present character evidence in
37
The evidence in Austin might still have been
rebuttal.
objectionable because it was in the form of specific instances rather
38
But the Austin court’s ruling had
than reputation evidence.
nothing to do with form. Rather, it suggested that rebuttal
character evidence was not allowed in any form. It held:
It was error for the court to receive the evidence. If it was
introduced for the purpose of impeaching the defendant,
who had denied making such sales, it was clearly
inadmissible, for the state had no right, for the purpose of
discrediting defendant, to ask questions which were
immaterial to the issue, and which would tend to prove
against defendant an offense distinct from that charged in
the indictment.
...
32. Id.
33. Under modern doctrine, the evidence would likely be admitted on a nonpropensity theory both as “inextricably intertwined” evidence and also as evidence
of a linked plan.
34. 74 Minn. 463, 77 N.W. 301 (1898).
35. Id. at 464, 77 N.W. at 302.
36. Id.
37. LANGBEIN, supra note 20, at 196–98; See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (stating
that “evidence of a pertinent trait of character” of a defendant is admissible if
“offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same”); MINN. R. EVID.
404(a)(1) (same).
38. See FED. R. EVID. 405(a); MINN. R. EVID. 405(a).
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It is a general rule that evidence of a distinct and
independent offense cannot be admitted on the trial of a
defendant charged with a criminal offense. To admit
evidence of another criminal act would be to oppress a
defendant by trying him for an offense of which he has
had no notice, and for which he is unprepared, and,
frequently, to prejudice him in the eyes of the jury. There
are well-known exceptions to this rule, but the evidence
now under consideration does not bring the case within
39
any of the exceptions.
Once again, to modern eyes, the conclusion in Austin looks too
strong because it appears to endorse a categorical ban on rebuttal
evidence rather than a narrower ban based on the form of the
rebuttal evidence.
As for rationales for the rule, the Austin court mentioned
three. First, mimicking Hoberg and Hoyt, the court suggested that
40
uncharged offenses were “immaterial” to the charged offense.
41
Second, the court mentioned surprise and lack of notice. And
42
third, the court mentioned prejudice. As in Hoberg and Hoyt, the
court did not elaborate on the nature of the prejudice.
In short, the earliest Minnesota cases applied a robust but
naïve form of the character evidence rule. The character evidence
rule initially appeared to be categorical, and the Minnesota
Supreme Court did not initially recognize exceptions that had
already been recognized in other jurisdictions. As for the rule’s
rationale, the court only spoke generally of prejudice. It never
explained what sort of prejudice evidence of other crimes would
produce. In particular, it never explained whether its view of
prejudice included the propensity inference itself, or the risk or
preventative detention, or both.
B. Development of Limitations and Exceptions
The early Minnesota cases of Hoberg, Hoyt, and Austin
suggested that evidence of uncharged misconduct was categorically
inadmissible, no matter the context or purpose. Those rulings
were out of step with the standard interpretations of the character
evidence rule that prevailed elsewhere. But before long, the
39.
40.
41.
42.

Austin, 74 Minn. at 464, 77 N.W. at 302 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Minnesota Supreme Court began to develop a far more moderate
rule. It did so by recognizing several limitations and exceptions.
First, the court recognized that evidence of uncharged acts
could be admitted if they were part of the same transaction or
series of events as the charged crime. In other words, the court
43
began to develop the “res gestae” doctrine. Its first limitation of
44
this sort came in State v. Madigan in 1894. A lawyer was charged
with perjury for filing a fraudulent lawsuit that the plaintiff had not
45
The prosecution presented evidence that the
authorized.
defendant, prior to filing the suit, had forged a document claiming
46
The court held that the
to show the plaintiff’s authorization.
evidence was properly received because “[i]t certainly was material
on the question of whether or not defendant was the attorney of
47
[the plaintiff].”
Following Madigan, in a series of other cases around the turn
of the century, the court similarly held that where uncharged and
charged acts were “all one transaction,” evidence of the former
48
could be admitted to prove evidence of the latter. These cases
accepted a broader notion of relevance and materiality than the
court had initially endorsed. In so doing, they effectively (though
never explicitly) overruled Hoyt.
Second, the court began to suggest that the character evidence
rule did not apply, or did not apply as strongly, to prosecutions of
49
These case-based
certain crimes such as fraud and forgery.
exceptions had been recognized elsewhere in both the English and
50
early American applications of the character evidence rule.
Third, and most importantly, the court began to recognize
exceptions based on the purpose for which the uncharged acts
were offered. The exceptions were first described in detail in 1902

43. “Latin ‘thing done.’ The events at issue, or other events
contemporaneous with them. In evidence law, words and statements about the res
gestae are usually admissible under a hearsay exception . . . .” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1335 (8th ed. 2004).
44. 57 Minn. 425, 59 N.W. 490 (1894).
45. Id. at 428–31, 59 N.W. at 491–92.
46. Id. at 431, 59 N.W. at 492.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 72 Minn. 522, 526, 75 N.W. 715, 717 (1898); State
v. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474, 65 N.W. 63 (1895).
49. State v. Bourne, 86 Minn. 426, 90 N.W. 1105 (1902); Wilson, 72 Minn. at
527, 75 N.W. at 717.
50. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2.41, at 36–64.
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51

in State v. Fitchette.
After discussing the general rule excluding
evidence of uncharged misconduct, the court noted:
[S]everal well-defined exceptions to the general rule as
stated above have been recognized in the decided cases,–
as where facts tend to show a distinct hostility, jealousy, or
erotic passion indicated by a previous criminal act; or
where the transaction depends upon the specific intent
with which it is committed, when the claim can be made
that the investigated act was the result of a mistake; or
where the identity of the accused or of the instrumentality
to perpetrate the crime is so connected or involved in
some other act of guilt that one relates to the other; or,
again, where the previous offense is a part of a scheme or
52
conspiracy incidental to or involved in the one on trial.
The Fitchette court cautioned against overuse of the exceptions
and stressed that borderline cases should be resolved in favor of
53
exclusion.
But before long, the court began applying the
exceptions broadly.
C. Early Twentieth-Century Endorsements of the Propensity Inference
During the early twentieth century, as the character evidence
rule in Minnesota developed into something resembling its
modern form, it remained remarkably under-theorized.
In
explaining the rule, Fitchette relied on several late nineteenth
century evidence treatises. Quoting Wharton’s treatise, the court
described the rationale of the character rule:
[t]o admit evidence of such collateral facts would be to
oppress the party implicated by trying him on a case for
preparing which he has had no notice, and sometimes by
prejudicing the jury against him by publishing offenses of
which, even if guilty, he may have long since repented, or
which may have long since been condoned. Trials would,
by this process, be injuriously prolonged, the real issue
54
obscured, verdicts taken on side issues.
The endorsed rationale was thus still based largely on notions
of materiality, collaterality, and unfair surprise. The court’s stated
understanding of the prejudice was that it was unfair to inform the
51. 88 Minn. 145, 92 N.W. 527 (1902).
52. Id. at 148, 92 N.W. at 528.
53. See id. at 148–49, 92 N.W. at 528.
54. Id. at 148, 92 N.W. at 528 (quoting WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 29
(9th ed. 1884)).
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jury of past acts for which a defendant may have repented. The
modern concerns of preventative detention and overweighting
propensity had yet to appear.
More strikingly still, in several turn of the century cases, the
court made statements that appeared to endorse the propensity
56
inference. In Madigan, the court stated broadly that “[i]f the
evidence offered tends to prove the commission of the crime
charged, it is not incompetent because it also tends to prove the
57
58
In 1903 in State v. Ames, the
commission of another crime.”
court stated the matter in even stronger terms:
The question as to the admissibility of evidence of this
character has been before the courts often, and the rule
permitting its introduction is variously stated by judges;
but, reduced to its narrowest compass, the true rule is that
evidence of the commission of other crimes is admissible
when it tends corroboratively or directly to establish the
defendant’s guilt of the crime charged in the indictment
on trial, or some essential ingredient of such offense. As
stated by Chief Justice Parker in People v. Molineux: “Does
the evidence of the other crime fairly aid in establishing
the commission by defendant of the crime for which he is
being tried? And that test, and none other, is fairly
59
established by the authorities.”
Of course, the propensity inference itself is one means by
which evidence of other acts might “corroboratively establish” guilt
for the charged crime. Evidence of other crimes can aid in
establishing guilt—and one way that it can so aid is by
demonstrating the defendant’s propensity.
Ames was arguably ambiguous on the propriety of propensity
reasoning, but the court’s endorsement soon became more
60
explicit. In State v. Whipple in 1919, the court upheld the
admission of prior drug sales against a defendant charged with a
61
drug crime.
It was competent for the state to introduce evidence of
other sales of morphine to Chandler and of the sale of
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See id.
57 Minn. 425, 59 N.W. 490 (1894).
Id. at 432, 59 N.W. at 492.
90 Minn. 183, 96 N.W. 330 (1903).
Id. at 191–92, 96 N.W. at 333 (citation omitted).
143 Minn. 403, 173 N.W. 801 (1919).
See id. at 407, 173 N.W. at 802.
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morphine to other drug addicts, in violation of the
statute. Evidence of this character is admissible if it is part
of one plan or scheme carried on by defendant to willfully
violate the law, or if it tends to show an inclination or
predisposition to commit the offense charged. The evidence of
62
other offenses received in this case was within the rule.
The court thus held that evidence of uncharged misconduct was
admissible to show “inclination or predisposition”—which is to say
63
In a series of other
that it was admissible to show propensity.
cases over the next two decades, the court cited Ames and Whipple in
decisions allowing prior crimes as “confirmatory” or
“corroborating” evidence.
Ames’s endorsement of propensity reasoning was ambiguous,
and Whipple’s more explicit endorsement was not repeated by the
court. It certainly cannot be said that the Minnesota Supreme
Court consistently endorsed the propensity reasoning in the early
twentieth century. But at a minimum, those cases show that into the
mid-twentieth century, the Minnesota Supreme Court lacked a
clear understanding of the role that the propensity inference
played in the operation of the character evidence rule. As we will
see, that confusion has yet to be resolved.
D. The Brief Influence of Julius Stone in Minnesota
In the 1930s, Professor Julius Stone wrote two enormously
influential articles in the Harvard Law Review on the character
evidence rule and the admissibility of other acts evidence. Stone
64
traced the historical development of the rule, first in England,
65
and then in the United States. Stone contended that there was an
“original” form of the character evidence rule, and that there was
also a “spurious” form that had developed in the early and mid66
nineteenth century.
Under the “original rule,” according to Stone, “only evidence
relevant merely to propensity was excluded. Hence admissibility
depended upon the answer to one simple question. Is this
62. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
63. See id.
64. Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46
HARV. L. REV. 954 (1933).
65. Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV.
L. REV. 988 (1938).
66. Id. at 989–1004.
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evidence in any way relevant to a fact in issue otherwise than by
67
Under the apocryphal and
merely showing propensity?”
“spurious” form, by contrast, “the rule is stated as a broad rule
excluding evidence of all other bad acts, unless the evidence falls
68
within some one of a list of exceptions.” The different rules led
to different inquiries by courts:
What is the result? In the place of the inquiry—is this
evidence relevant otherwise than merely through
propensity? there is immediately substituted the inquiry—
does this evidence fall within any exception to the rule of
69
exclusion?
That spurious approach, argued Stone, led to a variety of problems
70
and misapplication.
The spurious rule was both overinclusive and underinclusive.
On one hand, the spurious approach led courts to exclude other
acts evidence that was relevant for non-propensity purposes simply
71
because they could not fit it within one of the listed exceptions.
On the other hand, the spurious approach led courts to admit
propensity evidence simply because it went to one of the excepted
72
categories:
[B]ecause attention is concentrated on interpreting the
list of exceptions, not only is the requirement of relevance
forgotten, but the very object of the original rule—to
prevent proof of guilt by proof of propensity to commit—
is quite forgotten, and eventually an exception is admitted
to the broad rule which admits evidence precisely for the
reason that the original rule excluded it. The broad rule,
which seemed to give greater protection to the accused,
has produced a rule depriving him of every shred of
73
protection.
Put differently, the spurious approach said that other acts were
generally inadmissible unless they were offered to show intent, for
example. But under this approach, courts allowed the admission of
other acts evidence to show intent by way of a propensity inference.
If courts allow the propensity inference for the purposes of showing
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1005.
Id.
See id. at 1005–08.
See id. at 1005–06.
See id. at 1033.
Id. at 1033.
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motive, intent, identity, and the like, then there is little or nothing
left of the character evidence rule. That fundamental problem,
identified by Stone in the 1930s, still plagues the rule in Minnesota
today.
For a brief moment, it appeared that the Minnesota Supreme
Court might follow Professor Stone’s recommendation to abandon
74
the “spurious rule.” In 1952 in St Paul v. Greene, the court
75
It discussed its previous
discussed Stone’s article at length.
exceptions-based approach, and noted the criticism from Stone
76
and others. The court seemed to admit that in some previous
cases, it had under the exceptions admitted evidence that was
77
indistinguishable from propensity. And while it did not ultimately
78
reject its prior cases, it at least hinted that it might.
But the seeds of reform in Greene never took root. Three years
79
later, in State v. DePauw, the court re-established its exceptions80
based approach. It there upheld the admission of prior unlinked
81
acts of molestation against an accused molester. In so doing, it
once again admitted evidence indistinguishable from propensity
simply because it arguably fit into one of the excepted categories.
E. Spreigl and the Shift to Procedure
In 1965 the court decided Spreigl, the case for which evidence
82
of uncharged misconduct in Minnesota is now named. In Spreigl,
the court for the first time recognized the modern rationales for
the character evidence rule, taken from Wigmore’s third edition:
The reasons thus marshalled in various forms are
reducible to three: (1) The over-strong tendency to
believe the defendant guilty of the charge merely because
he is a likely person to do such acts; (2) The tendency to
condemn, not because he is believed guilty of the present
charge, but because he has escaped unpunished from
74. 238 Minn. 202, 56 N.W.2d 423 (1952).
75. See id. at 205–06, 56 N.W.2d at 425–26.
76. See id. at 203–06, 56 N.W.2d at 424–26.
77. Id. at 206 & n.4, 56 N.W.2d at 426 & n.4.
78. See id. at 206 n.5 (noting Professor Stone’s criticism that the Minnesota
Supreme Court had previously admitted evidence “somewhat indistinguishable
from propensity”).
79. 246 Minn. 91, 74 N.W.2d 297 (1955).
80. Id. at 93–94, 74 N.W.2d at 299.
81. Id. at 95–96, 74 N.W.2d at 300.
82. 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965).

1384

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:4

other offences; * * * (3) The injustice of attacking one
necessarily unprepared to demonstrate that the attacking
83
evidence is fabricated * * *.
As it had in Greene, the court appeared to recognize that some of its
prior rulings (including DePauw) had allowed evidence
84
“In permitting evidence of
indistinguishable from propensity.
prior offenses to be received as a part of a common plan or
scheme, we have come perilously close to putting the defendant’s
85
character and record in issue . . . .”
“Perilously close” was an understatement, and yet the Spreigl
court refused to correct or limit those prior cases. The court did
not address the fundamental problem—the problem identified by
Professor Stone—regarding the role of the propensity inference in
cases where other acts evidence was offered for one of the other
purposes. In fact, the Spreigl court once again allowed the very
same type of evidence. As a substantive matter, it allowed the
admission of an accused molester’s other acts of molestation simply
because the “similarity of behavior is sufficient to justify receiving
86
the challenged evidence.”
What the court did instead was add a layer of procedural
protection. It added a notice requirement:
[W]e now hold that in the trial of this and future criminal
cases where the state seeks to prove that an accused has
been guilty of additional crimes and misconduct on other
occasions, although such evidence is otherwise admissible
under some exception to the general exclusionary rule, it
shall not hereafter be received unless within a reasonable
time before trial the state furnishes defendant in writing a
statement of the offenses it intends to show he has
committed, described with the particularity required of an
87
indictment or information . . . .
Of the three rationales for the character evidence rule cited by
Wigmore and noted by the court, the Spreigl notice rule addressed
only the third rationale. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted
when it subsequently rejected the Spreigl notice rule, “[w]hile this
rule may eliminate the surprise on the part of an accused, it does
83. Id. at 496, 139 N.W.2d at 172 (quoting JOHN H. WIGMORE, 1 WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 194 (Little, Brown, & Co. (1904)).
84. Id. at 493, 139 N.W.2d at 171.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 493, 139 N.W.2d at 170.
87. Id. at 496–97, 139 N.W.2d at 173.
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little to eliminate any confusion of issues, misleading of the jury, or
88
undue prejudice.” To put a finer point on it, the Spreigl decision
allowed the prosecution to convict by propensity so long as it
notified the defendant in advance that it planned to do so.
F.

The Impact of Rule 404

The Federal Rules took effect in 1973, and the parallel
Minnesota Rules followed in 1977. Under both, Rule 404 was
intended to codify the common law character evidence rule.
Unfortunately, the common law rule was just as confused around
the country as it was in Minnesota, and the drafters of Rule 404 did
89
little to alleviate the confusion.
Rule 404(b), the critical provision, stated:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
90
of mistake or accident.
To a large degree, the Rule reflected the “spurious” approach to
character evidence that Professor Stone had derided four decades
earlier. Some have suggested that the Rule was intended to
incorporate elements of both the original approach and the
91
spurious approach. But in any event, the Rule listed the typical
common law “exceptions” to the character evidence rule.
Moreover, the Rule did nothing to settle the question of whether,
or to what extent, propensity reasoning was allowed to prove one of
92
the excepted other purposes.
The Federal Advisory Committee said very little about Rule
404(b), which was surprising given the Rule’s importance, and
88. Whitty v. State, 149 N.W.2d 557, 565 (Wis. 1967).
89. See GREEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 173 (“The drafters of the Federal Rules
had the opportunity to propose a complete overhaul; they chose not to.”); WRIGHT
& GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 5239 (“Lamentably, the Advisory Committee chose to
leave the law in its messy state; Rule 404(b) does nothing to clarify the issues, and
may in some respects have muddied the waters even more.”).
90. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
91. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 4.3.2.
92. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 5239 (“Rule 404(b) is a good
illustration of Wigmore’s Rule of Codification: the ‘always conceded principle
should frequently be found solemnly enacted, while the important controversies . .
. are ignored and left without solution.’”) (quoting 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 523
n.1 (3d ed. 1940)).
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given how much controversy had arisen over the common law
93
rule. The Advisory Committee notes repeated that evidence of
other crimes was inadmissible to show character, but was admissible
94
for other purposes. It went on:
No mechanical solution is offered. The determination
must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice
outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of
the availability of other means of proof and other factors
appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule
95
403.
The Advisory Committee cited no representative case that
demonstrated a proper approach. It cited only a single piece of
authority: a 1956 Iowa Law Review article, Other Vices, Other Crimes, by
96
Professors Slough and Knightly.
The citation to Slough and Knightly’s article was surprising in
its own right since that article provided a stinging critique of
courts’ erosion of the character evidence rule. The authors argued
courts had fundamentally undermined the rule by creating so
many broad exceptions, many of which were applied in a
97
haphazard fashion. “Common law precepts, though well-meaning
and unctuously spoken, die quickly when trapped in the withering
98
crossfire of judicial exceptions.” Slough and Knightly particularly
criticized the willingness of courts to admit propensity evidence in
99
sex cases under the pretext of showing “design” and scheme.
Precedents justifying such pretexual admissions, they noted, spread
100
The authors concluded on a pessimistic
to other types of cases.
note: “present rules, void of common meaning, will never halt the
101
trend toward liberal admissibility.”
In citing Slough and Knightly’s article, the drafters of Rule 404
demonstrated that they recognized the problems with the common
law character rule and its exceptions. And yet they did nothing to
address, much less fix, those problems. The drafters codified what

93. FED. R. EVID. 404, advisory committee’s note.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id. (citing M.C. Slough & J. William Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes,
41 IOWA L. REV. 325 (1956)).
97. Slough & Knightly, supra note 96 at 349–50.
98. Id. at 325.
99. Id. at 332–36.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 349.
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they apparently knew was an incoherent mess. In any event,
because Rule 404 substantially codified the then-existing character
evidence rule, it did little to change the law. In Minnesota, when
considering evidence of uncharged misconduct, courts continued
to rely primarily on pre-Rules precedent such as Spreigl rather than
on the Rule itself.
II. THE PRESENT: CURRENT DOCTRINE AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
PROPENSITY EVIDENCE
Minnesota’s current doctrine on the character evidence rule is
a reflection of its past. The doctrine has a confused history, and
the confusion persists. As the character evidence rule developed,
Minnesota courts never articulated any coherent theory of when
(and whether) a propensity inference is allowed. Minnesota courts
have yet to articulate such a theory. That failing, moreover, is not
merely academic or theoretical. The concrete result is that
propensity evidence is regularly allowed in the guise of
404(b)/Spreigl evidence.
To be sure, the cases are far from uniform. The Spreigl issue is
litigated as much as or more than any issue in Minnesota criminal
102
law. With hundreds of appellate cases deciding Spreigl claims, it is
not surprising that there are some cross-currents and
contradictions, and it is impossible to describe the doctrine
completely in a few pages. Minnesota courts still occasionally
vacillate between more restrictive and less restrictive standards, just
103
But despite
as they did for the first century and a half of cases.
the admitted lack of uniformity, it is still possible to draw some
general conclusions about the Spreigl doctrine in Minnesota. In
general, Minnesota courts have adopted broad doctrines of
admissibility that allow evidence of uncharged misconduct even
when the primary or sole relevance of the evidence is based on
102. A LexisNexis search of Minnesota appellate cases in the last decade
containing the term “Spreigl” yields 433 results. A search for “Strickland” yields
431; “Miranda” yields 365; “Apprendi” yields 263; and “Batson” yields 99. See also
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 5239 (“There is no question of evidence more
frequently litigated in the appellate courts than the admissibility of evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts.”).
103. See Chad M. Oldfather, Other Bad Acts and the Failure of Precedent, 28 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 151, 153 (2001) (discussing and criticizing the “internal tensions
and inconsistencies” in Spreigl doctrine); Note, Evidence of Defendant’s Other Crimes:
Admissibility in Minnesota, 37 MINN. L. REV. 608 (1953) (discussing and criticizing
Minnesota’s approach to other acts evidence).
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propensity.
A. Some Foundational Issues
There are several other purposes listed in Rule 404(b), and as
a result, there are—or at least there should be—several distinct
404(b) doctrines. Before addressing specific difficulties with each
doctrine, it is worth noting some general, foundational problems
with the way in which Minnesota courts apply the character
evidence rule.
One foundational problem is that Minnesota courts
occasionally fall into the habit of treating the various “other
purposes” listed in Rule 404(b) as undifferentiated. While it is true
that the other purposes overlap in some respects, they are
nonetheless analytically distinct. The various listed purposes have
distinct meanings and distinct applications. When analyzing
evidence of uncharged misconduct, it is not enough to simply say
that it is relevant to show “motive, intent, plan, and identity.” That
sort of “laundry list” or “smorgasbord” approach has been
104
criticized by both courts and scholars, and yet Minnesota courts
105
occasionally employed it.
A second problem is that Minnesota courts treat the 404(b)
106
“other purposes” as “exceptions” to the character evidence rule.
Unlike the true exceptions to the character rule contained in Rules
404(a)(1), (2), and (3), the listed purposes in 404(b) are not
exceptions but rather non-character uses of other acts evidence.
While this mistake may seem merely semantic, it is symptomatic of
104. See, e.g., SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 9, § 404.02[9] (criticizing the
“laundry list” approach to Rule 404(b)).
105. See, e.g., Ture v. State, 681 N.W.2d 9, 15 (Minn. 2004) (“The district court
admitted the Edwards murder evidence for several purposes other than to identify
Ture as the murderer of Wohlenhaus as well as Edwards, including to illustrate
Ture’s intent and modus operandi.”); State v. Cote, No. A03-993, 2004 Minn. App.
LEXIS 639, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. June 4, 2004) (upholding the admission of
evidence “under the motive and common-plan exceptions” without analyzing the
difference between those two purposes); State v. Tennant, No. C3-89-2238, 1990
Minn. App. LEXIS 777, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 1990) (“The state offered
the prior assault conviction to show intent, identity, absence of mistake, and
common scheme or plan.”).
106. See, e.g., State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 20 (Minn. 2008) (referring to the
common plan “exception” to the character evidence rule); State v. Ness, 707
N.W.2d 676, 688 (Minn. 2006) (discussing the same); State v. McLeod, 705
N.W.2d 776, 785 (Minn. 2005) (discussing the same); Angus v. State, 695 N.W.2d
109, 119 (Minn. 2005) (discussing the various Spreigl “exceptions to the general
exclusionary rule”).
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a larger problem—a failure to understand what Rule 404(b) means
107
and what it allows.
Ultimately, the core flaw with the current Spreigl doctrine is
that Minnesota courts often examine only whether uncharged
misconduct is relevant to prove a 404(b) purpose, but they fail to
examine how it is relevant. Uncharged misconduct is almost always
relevant to identity or intent, for example, because the propensity
inference itself almost always provides relevance. The important
question is whether the uncharged misconduct is relevant in some
way that does not rely on the propensity inference. The important
question, in other words, is whether there is some non-propensity
chain of inferences that demonstrates motive, plan, intent, identity,
and so on.
That question is admittedly very difficult to answer in some
cases. In some cases, the distinction between propensity and nonpropensity reasoning will be difficult to decipher. In such cases,
reasonable jurists could disagree about whether some piece of
evidence evades propensity reasoning or not. But while the answer
will not always be clear, questioning the precise means of relevance
is critical to proper 404(b) analysis. Minnesota courts occasionally
108
ask that critical question, but generally they do not. They do not
appear to recognize that it makes any difference.
A few examples show the depth of the problem. In State v.
Hill, the defendant was accused of having sex with his girlfriend’s
109
The State presented evidence that, ten years
young daughter.
110
earlier, he had sex with another girlfriend’s young daughter.
The court of appeals upheld admission of the evidence to show
“identity” on this basis: “[b]ecause Hill committed a similar crime
in a similar way against similarly situated victims, it is more likely
that Hill is the person who abused RBL [(the eight-year-old

107. See FISHER, supra note 10, at 150 (“[T]hinking of the permitted purposes
listed in Rule 404(b) as ‘exceptions’ to the propensity evidence ban can lead a
court astray.”).
108. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 749 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he
legitimacy of the purpose must be demonstrated, and the talismanic invocation of
an item from the rule 404(b) list does not constitute such a demonstration.”);
State v. Montgomery, 707 N.W.2d 392, 398 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (“It is not
sufficient simply to recite a 404(b) purpose without also demonstrating at least an
arguable legitimacy of that purpose.”).
109. State v. Hill, No. A06-371, 2007 Minn. App. LEXIS 273, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Mar. 27, 2007).
110. Id. at *3.
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111

It said nothing more about the precise means of
daughter)].”
relevance.
112
In State v. Anderson,
a defendant was charged with
113
The State admitted evidence that a week
manufacturing meth.
after the arrest for the charged offense, Anderson was again
114
The court of
arrested for attempting to manufacture meth.
appeals upheld the admission of the evidence on this basis:
“Anderson’s subsequent arrest is sufficiently similar to make it
relevant to the present offense, thus satisfying the [relevance
115
requirement].” It said nothing more about the precise means of
relevance.
Hill and Anderson are extreme examples of a common
tendency that runs through Minnesota Spreigl cases. Courts note
that evidence of some other act is relevant for some accepted
404(b) purposes and thus admit the evidence without saying
anything further. The result is often a tacit endorsement of
propensity reasoning and a broad doctrine of admissibility for
evidence of uncharged misconduct.
B. Unlinked Plans and the General Similarity Test
The single most important source of Minnesota’s very broad
doctrine of admissibility is its adoption of the “unlinked plan”
theory of the common plan doctrine. One of the enumerated
116
404(b) purposes is “plan.” Thus, under Rule 404(b), evidence of
a defendant’s uncharged misconduct may be admitted to show his
plan. Most evidence law authorities state that to be admissible
under the common plan doctrine, the uncharged acts should be
117
somehow linked with the charged crime.
111. Id. at *5.
112. No. A03-1629, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 1065 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 21,
2004).
113. Id. *1.
114. Id. at *3–4.
115. Id. at *8–9.
116. MINN. R. EVID. 404(b); accord FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
117. See, e.g., 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 88, § 3.24 (criticizing the “unlinked
plan” doctrine); 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 113, at 668 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the same); 2 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra, note 5, § 404.22[5][a] (discussing the same); Miguel A. Mendez &
Edward J. Imwinkelried, People v. Ewoldt: The California Supreme Court’s About-Face on
the Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct, 28 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 473 (1995) (discussing the same); Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the
Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule 404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 233–34
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Under the “linked plan” theory, where uncharged and
charged acts are both integral parts of some overarching criminal
118
plan, uncharged acts are admissible. Thus, for example, “when a
criminal steals a car to use it in a robbery, the automobile theft can
119
be proved in a prosecution for the robbery.”
In such an
example, because the uncharged act of theft is directly linked to
the charged offense, the relevance of the uncharged act does not
depend on a propensity inference.
Minnesota, however, does not require any direct linkage
between charged and uncharged acts. Rather, to admit evidence
under Minnesota’s “common plan or scheme” doctrine, the
prosecution need only show that the charged and uncharged acts
120
The test, in
are “similar in time, place, or modus operandi.”
other words, is not one of linkage or interdependence; it is instead
a test of similarity. Minnesota’s doctrine is an example of what
evidence scholars have called the “unlinked plan” or “spurious
121
plan” theory of the common plan doctrine.
1.

Problems with the “Unlinked Plan” Doctrine

There are several problems with Minnesota’s unlinked plan
doctrine. First, Minnesota courts have effectively merged the plan
doctrine with the “modus operandi” doctrine. Such a merger is
unwise, because the “two theories proceed from very different
premises, fundamentally affecting how each theory should
122
operate.”
Second, similarity is a vague and indeterminate metric for
admissibility. Minnesota courts have a long history of admitting
123
In State v.
evidence with a fairly low degree of similarity.
(2005) (discussing the same); Susan Stuart, Evidentiary Use of Other Crime Evidence: A
Survey of Recent Trends in Criminal Procedure, 20 IND. L. REV. 183, 197 (1987)
(discussing the same); Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform:
Thayer’s Triumph, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2437, 2470–71 (2000) (discussing the same).
118. David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, “Other Crimes” Evidence in Sex Offense
Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 546–47 (1994).
119. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006).
120. State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 390 (Minn. 1998).
121. See, e.g., Bryden & Park, supra note 118, at 550.
122. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 13.5, at 720.
123. See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 721 N.W.2d 871, 877–78 (Minn. 2006)
(upholding the admission of prior burglaries of elderly victims against a defendant
charged with murder in the course of a burglary); State v. Wright, 719 N.W.2d 910,
917–18 (Minn. 2006) (admitting a thirteen-year-old unlinked assault conviction to
show a “common scheme” for a charged murder); State v. Berry, 484 N.W.2d 14,
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124

Kennedy,
the Minnesota Supreme Court said that, to be
admissible, Spreigl evidence need only be “sufficiently or
125
More recently, in
substantially similar to the charged offense.”
an apparent effort to tighten the requirements of admissibility (and
in an arguable rejection of the Kennedy standard), the court
126
emphasized in State v. Ness that uncharged and charged acts must
127
Ness may have succeeded in tightening
bear “marked similarity.”
128
the standards somewhat, but Minnesota courts have nonetheless
continued to rely on the Kennedy standard and admit evidence with
129
low degrees of similarity.
But, regardless of whether “marked” rather than “substantial”
similarity is required, the more fundamental problem is that the
130
Indeed, in many
notion of similarity itself is deeply relative.
17–18 (Minn. 1992) (admitting three prior instances of dissimilar violence
because “[e]ach of the three incidents is relevant because of the similarity of the
way appellant behaved when trying to maintain control of the people with whom
he worked.”); State v. Krueth, No. A06-1590, 2008 Minn. App. LEXIS 486, at *5
(Minn. Ct. App. May 6, 2008) (upholding the admission of another murder in a
murder case because “both victims were killed in darkness; both were killed with
one shot; both were killed in their homes.”); State v. Bloodsaw, No. C7-01-365,
2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 1407, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2001) (upholding
the admission of a prior offense for promoting prostitution to show a current
offense of promoting prostitution because both involved transporting prostitutes
to a motel to meet with customers); State v. Schulberg, No. C4-95-2709, 1996
Minn. App. LEXIS 1120, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 1996) (upholding the
admission of prior thefts and burglaries because “[e]ach was an offense against
property”).
124. 585 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 2006).
125. Id. at 391.
126. 707 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. 2006).
127. Id. at 688; see also State v. Clark, 738 N.W.2d 316, 346–48 (Minn. 2007)
(finding that the trial court had admitted insufficiently similar evidence but also
finding the error harmless); State v. Black, No. A06-2390, 2008 Minn. LEXIS 379
(Minn. July 15, 2008) (summarily reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision to
uphold the admission of Spreigl evidence, and remanding for reconsideration in
light of Ness’ “marked similarity” requirement).
128. See, e.g., State v. Black, No. A06-2390r, 2008 Minn. App. LEXIS 1226, at
*8–17 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2008); State v. Matlock, No. A06-1385, 2007 Minn.
App. LEXIS 1019, at *7–9 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2007).
129. See, e.g., State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 20–22 (Minn. 2008) (upholding
the admission of a prior burglary conviction to show “common plan” in a rape and
murder case); State v. Carlson, No. A07-2144, 2009 Minn. App. LEXIS 175, at *8–
15 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2009) (relying on the Kennedy “substantially similar”
standard and upholding the admission of evidence); State v. Petrin, No. A06-1913,
2008 Minn. App. LEXIS 586, at *6–11 (Minn. Ct. App. May 20, 2008).
130. See Nelson Goodman, Seven Strictures on Similarity, in EXPERIENCE & THEORY
19, 19 (L. Foster & J. Swanson eds. 1970) (“Similarity, ever ready to solve
philosophical problems and overcome obstacles, is a pretender, an impostor, a
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cases, there is no way to determine which factors cut which way. If
a man rapes one woman in Duluth and another in Minneapolis, are
the two rapes geographically similar because they both took place
in the same state, or are they geographically different because they
took place 150 miles apart? Asking that question is roughly
equivalent to asking whether I am similar to a chimp.
Third, and most fundamentally, Minnesota’s doctrine allows
an inference that is indistinguishable from a propensity inference.
The fact that an accused rapist has raped before in a roughly
similar fashion does not show that he had a “plan” or “scheme” to
commit both rapes—what it shows is that he commits the same type
of offense repeatedly. What it shows, in other words, is propensity.
In fact, the Minnesota Supreme Court has explicitly stated that
such evidence is allowed to “complete the picture” of the
131
defendant, which seems like an invitation for character-based
reasoning.
The risks presented by such evidence are precisely the same
risks that motivate the character rule, and the unlinked plan theory
“effectively eviscerates the character ban whenever the individual
132
Admitting similar acts “on
has engaged in similar misconduct.”
the theory that they prove plan often smacks of a thin fiction that
merely disguises what is in substance the forbidden propensity
133
inference.”
A test based on similarity gets the rule backward. As
uncharged acts grow more similar to charged acts, they
undoubtedly become more relevant, but they become more
relevant largely because the propensity inference itself becomes
stronger. If Minnesota courts were to recognize that the propensity
inference is itself off-limits (even when used to show a Spreigl
purpose), then increased similarity would raise the prejudicial
value more than the probative value. But Minnesota courts do not
recognize that point. Instead, the current doctrine implicitly
suggests that a stronger propensity inference based on similarity
actually counts in favor of admission rather than against it.

quack.”); Robert N. Strassfeld, Causal Comparisons, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 913, 941
(1992) (“[S]imilarity is an especially elusive and troublesome concept.”).
131. State v. Lynch, 590 N.W.2d 75, 81 (Minn. 1999); State v. Berry, 484
N.W.2d 14, 18 (Minn. 1992).
132. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 9.2.2, at 575.
133. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 117.
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Wermerskirchen, Wigmore, and Wright

Minnesota courts have been largely impervious to the
criticisms of the unlinked plan doctrine (as well as to those
criticisms directed specifically at Minnesota case law on uncharged
134
The closest thing to a defense of the doctrine
misconduct).
135
came in State v. Wermerskirchen, where the Minnesota Supreme
Court reaffirmed the broad doctrine of admissibility in cases of sex
136
crimes. In so doing, the court sniffed at critics:
It is undoubtedly true that some academic commentators
would like the “common scheme or plan” doctrine to be
one with a quite narrow application. These commentators
also would like to limit other-crime evidence so that it may
not be admitted to show the corpus delicti, to prove the
doing of the act charged. Whatever the possible general
merits of these arguments or their possible persuasiveness
in some contexts, it is clear that in the specific context of
rape and sex abuse prosecutions, particularly child sex
abuse prosecutions, we have rejected the argument
137
propounded by these academic commentators.
The court did not name or cite the “academic commentators” to
which it was responding, and it is doubtful whether any such
commentator has ever argued that other crimes are never
admissible to prove the doing of the act charged—that was merely a
straw man. The court’s suggestion that sex crimes provide a
particular reason for rejecting such criticisms was also strange
because Minnesota has never limited the broad unlinked plan
138
doctrine to sex crimes.
Somewhat more substantively, the court in Wermerskirchen went
on to argue that its broad doctrine of admissibility was supported
by eminent authorities including both Wigmore himself and also
139
But its reliance on those authorities was, to put
Charles Wright.
it mildly, dubious.
It is true that Wigmore argued that sexual assaults on other
victims could, in at least some cases, be used as non-propensity

134. For earlier criticisms of Minnesota law, see Oldfather, supra note 103 and
Note, supra note 103.
135. 497 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. 1992).
136. Id. at 240.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
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evidence of plan or design. But even assuming that Wigmore was
correct, he imposed several limitations on the plan doctrine that
Minnesota has never followed. First, Wigmore cautioned that the
relevant “plan” must be some “plan to do the specific act charged”
(rather than just a general “plan” to rape people), and without
141
such a limitation, the evidence would violate the character rule.
Second, Wigmore emphasized that the test was a “stringent” one
requiring a “much higher degree of similarity” similar to the
142
Third, Wigmore quoted
traditional modus operandi doctrine.
with approval court cases holding that to be admissible as evidence
of plan or design, uncharged acts must be somehow “connected”
143
with the charged acts.
Wigmore offered a telling example of the sort of case where a
sexual assault on another woman could be admitted to show plan
or design. If a man were charged with assaulting a woman in her
house, the prosecution could admit evidence “that the defendant
on the same day, with a confederate guarding the house, assaulted
other women in the same family who escaped, leaving the
complainant as the only woman accessible to him for his
144
In such a case, where the two assaults were highly
purpose.”
similar and truly connected, evidence of one could be offered to
show the defendant’s plan or design, which would demonstrate
that he had in fact committed the other.
Minnesota has never limited its common plan doctrine to cases
of the sort Wigmore had in mind. In fact, Minnesota has adopted
precisely the sort of general similarity test that Wigmore expressly
rejected. The Wermerskirchen court’s reliance on Wigmore as
apparent support for its broad doctrine was misplaced.
The court’s reading of Wright’s treatise was downright
tendentious. Professor Wright had indeed recognized that many
145
courts had freely admitted other crimes evidence in sex cases.
He suggested that courts did so because they were “understandably
desperate for some evidence beyond the victim’s accusation that
will prove that the accused did the acts of which he stands
146
The thrust of Wright’s argument was that, due to the
charged.”
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 357.
Id. § 304, at 249 n.1.
Id. § 304, at 251.
Id. § 304, at 252.
Id. § 304, at 249.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 5239, at 461–62.
Id.
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powerful moral and political forces at play in rape cases, courts had
(essentially for policy reasons) stretched the doctrine to admit
147
other crimes evidence.
But while the nature of rape cases makes such decisions
“understandable,” Wright never suggested that such decisions were
148
In fact, he
legally justified under the character evidence rule.
went on to say that courts had relied on “debatable assumptions
149
He
about recidivism and problematic psychiatric theories.”
argued that courts had admitted such evidence “under the guise”
of Rule 404(b), when in fact the evidence was only relevant to show
“the propensity inference that the general rule in 404(b) is
150
In short, by selectively quoting Wright’s
supposed to exclude.”
treatise, the Wermerskirchen court implied that Wright had endorsed
the very cases he criticized.
If the character evidence rule bars propensity inferences, the
unlinked plan doctrine cannot be justified. Minnesota courts,
however, have long allowed an expansive form of the doctrine, and
they have never responded to, or even recognized, the mass of
evidence law authority criticizing the doctrine. By accepting
evidence of uncharged acts based merely on similarity, Minnesota
courts have implicitly accepted propensity reasoning.
C. From Unlinked Plans to Other “Exceptions”
The common plan or scheme doctrine dominates Spreigl cases
in Minnesota. The doctrine is so expansive that it often obviates
the need to examine the other listed 404(b) purposes. In some
cases, moreover, Minnesota courts seem to treat the general
similarity test for the scheme doctrine as being the overriding test
151
But even to the extent that separate
for all 404(b) purposes.
147. See id. § 5239, at 462.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at n.5.
151. See State v. Perez, 397 N.W.2d 916, 919 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(“Regardless of the purpose for which the evidence is admitted, there must be
some relationship in time, location, or modus operandi between the crime
charged and the [prior crime] . . . .”); see also State v. Tabaka, No. A05-1899, 2007
Minn. App. LEXIS 337, at *18 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2007) (stating that for
evidence offered to show knowledge, relevance and materiality depend on
similarity); Bendzula v. State, No. A05-137, 2005 Minn. App. LEXIS 305, at *9–10
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2005) (relying on common plan standard and holding
that prior similar drug offenses were relevant to show “access to drugs”); State v.
Jones, No. A03-1136, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 951 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2004)
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doctrines for other purposes are developed, they exhibit their own
similar problems. The problems all stem from courts’ failure to
examine and explain exactly how a particular piece of uncharged
misconduct evidence demonstrates a particular 404(b) purpose.
1.

Intent and Absence of Mistake or Accident

Some form of intent is an element of most crimes. A
defendant can negate intent by showing that his conduct was the
152
result of an accident or mistake. Rule 404(b) states that evidence
of other acts can be used to show “intent” and also “absence of
153
The two categories, though listed
mistake or accident.”
separately, are almost coextensive. They are properly treated
together because “‘[a]bsence of mistake or accident’ is generally
154
synonymous with intent.”
Minnesota courts, however, have not always recognized that
“intent” and “absence of mistake or accident” are essentially
155
synonymous under the rule. In State v. Clark, for example, the
Minnesota Supreme Court treated the two categories as entirely
separate. The defendant and his accomplice Reed were charged
156
The state admitted evidence that
with killing a police officer.
157
Clark and Reed had also robbed a bank. The court held that the
evidence was not admissible to show intent, but it nonetheless held
158
that the evidence was admissible to show “absence of mistake.” It
offered no explanation for the distinction.
At other times, Minnesota courts have allowed the admission
to show “absence of accident” even when no issue of intent was
159
the defendant was charged with
raised. In State v. Nelson,

(stating that for evidence offered to show motive, “[r]elevance and materiality
depend on” similarity); State v. Cote, No. A03-993, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 639, at
*9 (Minn. Ct. App. June 8, 2004) (applying similarity test for evidence admitted
“under the motive and common-plan exceptions”).
But see MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, § 4:30 (“One might think that the important thing is a
close resemblance between the prior and the charged offense. Often resemblance
does indeed count, but not always.”).
152. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 10, at 148.
153. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
154. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 7.2.2, at 429.
155. 755 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 2008).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 245.
158. Id. at 261.
159. 562 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
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160

assaulting her daughter.
The defendant claimed that her
daughter’s injuries were caused while playing with her sister—she
denied, in other words, that she had committed the charged
161
The court of appeals upheld the admission of
conduct at all.
evidence of a prior instance of abuse on the theory that it showed
162
But the
“absence of accident” and thus rebutted the defense.
defense, although it involved a claimed accident, had nothing to do
163
with intent.
If the evidence had any relevance aside from
propensity, the court failed to identify it.
Finally, even where Minnesota courts do recognize the
congruence between intent and absence of mistake, they often fail
to recognize that intent is an ultimate fact that is usually the “last
inference in a logical chain of reasoning that leads through other
164
To the extent that
facts” such as knowledge, motive, or plan.
intent can be proved more directly by evidence of other acts, it is
165
Minnesota courts
typically through the “doctrine of chances.”
166
have almost never discussed the doctrine of chances, and yet they
have admitted evidence of uncharged acts to show intent without
explaining how the evidence demonstrates intent, and without
explaining whether the chain of reasoning actually avoids the
167
propensity inference.

160. Id. at 325.
161. Id. at 326.
162. Id. at 327.
163. Nor was the prior incident otherwise relevant through the doctrine of
chances. Id.
164. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 7.1, at 426.
165. Id. § 7.3.2.
166. The only discussion of the doctrine by a Minnesota appellate court came
in a recent unpublished case. State v. Owens, No. A06-2481, 2008 Minn. App.
LEXIS 495, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. May 6, 2008) (“The doctrine of chances has not
been adopted by Minnesota appellate courts, but the principles underlying the
doctrine are similar to those underlying Minnesota’s other-bad-acts rule.”).
167. State v. Babcock, No. C9-03-131, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 1465 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 9, 2003) (upholding the admission of prior instances of violence to
show absence of mistake in a murder case); State v. Belssner, 463 N.W.2d 903,
909–10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a defendant’s previous convictions for
forgeries were relevant to show his intent in the charged forgery because the
previous instances were similar); State v. Stevens, No. C7-88-935, 1989 Minn. App.
LEXIS 343 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1989) (upholding the admission of other
frauds, without further analysis, because they “were plainly relevant to show intent
and absence of mistake”).
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Knowledge

Knowledge is an element of some criminal offenses. For
example, to prove a drug possession offense, the prosecution must
168
prove that the defendant knew the nature of the substance.
169
If a defendant claims
Other acts can demonstrate knowledge.
that he thought the cocaine found in his possession was baby
powder, the prosecution can admit evidence of other instances of
knowing cocaine possession to prove the element of knowledge in
170
the charged crime.
But the probative value of such evidence depends in large part
on the nature of the defense. In drug cases where the dispute
centers on some other element, the use of prior convictions to
171
Minnesota courts
show knowledge is much more dubious.
nonetheless regularly admit such evidence regardless of the nature
172
of the defense. In State v. Tabaka, for example, the court of
appeals upheld the admission of the defendant’s prior meth
convictions to show “that he knew what methamphetamine is,”
even though there was no suggestion that Tabaka had presented
173
any lack of knowledge defense.
174
Similarly, in State v. Datwyler, a defendant was charged with
175
The defendant had essentially
conspiracy to manufacture meth.
conceded that she was planning to manufacture meth—she had
conceded, in other words, attempted manufacture, but she contested
176
The State was
conspiracy, which carries a greater punishment.
allowed to present evidence of her prior conviction for
manufacturing meth on the theory that it demonstrated her
168. United States v. Eggleston, 165 F.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir. 1999).
169. Such evidence is important especially where the defendant’s knowledge is
disputed. Minnesota courts admit Spreigl evidence to show knowledge regardless
of whether knowledge is disputed. See State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965).
170. See Eggleston, 165 F.3d at 624. Similarly, where a defendant presents a
“mere presence” defense, the prosecution can admit evidence of other instances
of the defendant encountering the illegal substance. See, e.g., State v. Schostag,
No. C9-95-2236, 1996 WL 422511, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 30, 1996).
171. See Eggleston, 165 F.3d at 624; NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 6.3.1, at 391.
172. No. A05-1899, 2007 Minn. App. LEXIS 337 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 17,
2007)
173. Id. at *18. See, e.g., State v. Penny, No. C3-03-142, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS
314, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2004); State v. Schostag, No. C9-95-2236, 1996
Minn. App. LEXIS 884, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. July 30, 1996.).
174. No. A04-2255, 2006 Minn. App. LEXIS 93, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 24,
2006).
175. Id.
176. Id. at *8.
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177

“knowledge of the manufacturing process.”
Her knowledge was
not disputed, and in any event, it had no tendency to prove the
178
The
agreement necessary to support the conspiracy charge.
court of appeals nonetheless upheld the admission of the Spreigl
179
evidence to show her knowledge.
In cases like Tabaka and Datwyler, “the uncharged misconduct
180
evidence is relevant on both character and non-character bases.”
The relative strength of each inference depends on the case—it
depends largely on the nature of the defense presented. In cases
181
like Tabaka and Datwyler, where knowledge is not contested, the
probative value of the non-character inference is minimal, and thus
the possibility that the jury will use the evidence primarily to
support a character inference is much greater. The cases are
182
certainly not uniform, but Minnesota courts too often admit such
evidence.
3.

Identity

Identity is always an element of a crime—the prosecution must
always prove that the defendant—not someone else—committed
183
Like intent, identity is one
the conduct constituting the offense.
of the listed 404(b) purposes, but like intent, it is rarely a distinct
ground for admission. Identity is almost always proven by means of
184
one of the other purposes, such as motive, opportunity, or plan.
177. Id. at *4.
178. Id. at *6.
179. Id. at *6–8.
180. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 6.3.1, at 382.
181. Even where knowledge of some sort is denied, the relevance of the
evidence depends on the nature of the denial. In State v. Anderson, No. A04-1888,
2005 Minn. App. LEXIS 571 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2005), for example, a
defendant charged with meth possession testified that he was not aware that there
was a baggie of meth under his car seat. The court upheld the admission of his
prior meth offense to show knowledge. Id. at *14–15. But while the prior
conviction clearly demonstrated knowledge of the nature of the substance, it is
difficult to see how it demonstrated any knowledge that there was a meth baggie
under his seat on that occasion—again, the primary relevance is propensity.
182. See State v. Jones, No. A06-35, 2007 Minn. App. LEXIS 525 (Minn. Ct.
App. June 5, 2007) (reversing conviction where prior gun crimes were admitted to
show that the defendant knew there was a gun in the car); State v. Montgomery,
707 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (reversing drug conviction where the state
admitted prior drug convictions as Spreigl evidence).
183. See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 571 (2008) (“Identification of the defendant
as the guilty actor is essential, so that any evidence which serves to establish the
actor’s identity is relevant, and, if competent, is admissible.”).
184. At times, Minnesota courts have suggested that Spreigl evidence may
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Minnesota courts unfortunately fall into the trap of “us[ing]
the ‘identity’ label to justify admission of uncharged misconduct
evidence without analyzing the logic that supports that
185
186
In State v. Clark, for example, the supreme court
conclusion.”
stated that another robbery with an accomplice was admissible to
show identity as common actors, but it made no effort to explain
187
how it showed identity without relying on propensity.
188
In State v. Smith, a defendant was charged with being a felon
in possession of a firearm, but he denied that the gun discovered by
189
police belonged to him. The court of appeals held that two prior
190
felon-in-possession convictions were relevant to show identity.
The other-acts evidence, showing conclusively that at one
time he admitted to possessing a gun when he was
ineligible to do so and showing convincingly that he was
in the presence of guns at the same location and at a time
not remote from the date of the search, surely made it
more likely that he possessed the gun at issue than if there
was no such other-acts evidence. The evidence was
relevant for the purpose of showing the identity of Smith
191
as the possessor of a firearm.
While it is true that the prior convictions for possessing other
weapons “surely made it more likely” that Smith possessed the
weapon in the charged incident, the important question is how they
192
make it more likely.
It is difficult to see how they do so other
than by propensity reasoning.
Ironically, the opinion in Smith contained one of the most
sophisticated discussions of the character rule ever found in
Minnesota law. It came closer than any other Minnesota case in
history to endorsing the traditional view of Rule 404(b). And yet in
the end, the Smith court endorsed an apparent a chain of
inferences—from prior possession of a different gun to “identity”
in the charged incident—that has little or no probative force apart
demonstrate identity only by way of the common plan doctrine. See State v.
Matlock, No. A06-1385, 2007 Minn. App. LEXIS 1019, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct.
2, 2007).
185. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 12.3, at 694.
186. 755 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 2008).
187. Id.
188. 749 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
189. Id. at 90–91.
190. Id. at 94.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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from propensity.
4.

Summary

These cases analyzing identity, knowledge, and intent are just a
small sample of the hundreds of Minnesota appellate cases
involving Spreigl evidence.
This sample is not perfectly
representative of the massive body of Spreigl law—no sample could
be, since conflicting threads abound within the case law. But this
sample nonetheless demonstrates the critical feature of
Minnesota’s Spreigl doctrine, which is a failure to follow—or even
recognize—the traditional view of Rule 404(b).
Under the traditional view, when evidence is offered for a
404(b) other purpose, the critical question is not whether the
evidence is relevant, but how the evidence is relevant. Under the
traditional view, courts must ask whether the evidence of
uncharged misconduct is relevant through some means other than
propensity. Minnesota courts do not ask that question. Because
the core principle of the traditional view is absent in Minnesota,
the Spreigl doctrine is largely unmoored. Uncharged misconduct
evidence is often admitted but occasionally excluded, and other
than the general similarity test taken from the common plan
doctrine, it is difficult to find any guiding principle that runs
through the cases.
D. More Procedural Protections
But even as current Minnesota law freely admits 404(b)
evidence, however, it provides unusual procedural protections.
Since Spreigl, the Minnesota Supreme Court has identified “[a]
number of procedural requirements and safeguards [to] govern
the admission, presentation, and consideration of other-crime
193
These safeguards were ultimately translated into a
evidence.”
194
five-part test adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court. In 2006,
195
the same five-part test was written into Rule 404(b) itself.
The
amended rule now states:
In a criminal prosecution, such evidence shall not be
admitted unless 1) the prosecutor gives notice of its intent
to admit the evidence consistent with the rules of criminal
193.
194.
195.

State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 196 (Minn. 1995).
State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 686 (Minn. 2006).
MINN. R. EVID. 404(b).
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procedure; 2) the prosecutor clearly indicates what the
evidence will be offered to prove; 3) the other crime,
wrong, or act and the participation in it by a relevant
person are proven by clear and convincing evidence; 4)
the evidence is relevant to the prosecutor’s case; and 5)
the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by
196
its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.
The first requirement—that of pre-trial notice—is drawn from
Spreigl itself.
The fourth requirement probably does nothing other than
restate the general relevance requirement of Rules 401 and 402
197
The second requirement is also
that applies to all evidence.
possibly superfluous—a party offering evidence has a general
obligation to indicate its relevance (at least if the admission is
198
contested).
But arguably the “clearly indicates” language
imposes some heightened level of precision on the prosecution.
The third requirement—the clear and convincing standard—is
more concrete. It marks a departure from federal law, under
which questions regarding the existence and participation of the
other act are governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) and the
199
standard developed in Huddleston v. United States. The Huddleston
standard merely requires evidence sufficient to support a finding
200
that the previous act occurred. Minnesota’s clear and convincing
standard is much more stringent. Of course, in cases where the
other act resulted in a conviction, and has thus already been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard makes no
difference.
The fifth requirement also marks a departure from federal law.
Under federal law, the balancing test for 404(b) evidence is drawn
from Rule 403. Rule 403 allows exclusion only if the potential for
unfair prejudice “substantially outweigh[s]” the probative value of

196. Id.; see also id. advisory committee cmt. (2006).
197. See MINN. R. EVID. 401, 402.
198. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (stating that in order to preserve a claim of error
for excluding evidence, a party must make “the substance of the evidence . . .
known to the court”); MINN. R. EVID. 103(a) (restating the corresponding federal
rule); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, § 1.5, at 17 (“[A]n offer of proof
should indicate the nature or content of the evidence and describe its purpose
and why it is relevant (at least if there is room for doubt).”).
199. 485 U.S. 681 (1988); see also NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 4.8, at 294
(discussing state law departures from Huddleston).
200. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685.
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201

the evidence.
By contrast, Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)
employs a specialized and more restrictive version of the balancing
202
The
test: one that eliminates the modifier “substantially.”
Minnesota Advisory Committee intentionally adopted this “more
stringent test” to make clear that a “slight balance in favor of unfair
203
prejudice requires exclusion.”
The more restrictive balancing test is meant to favor criminal
defendants. But the test can function properly only if courts are
clear about what is weighed on each side of the scale—about what
counts as legitimate probative value, and what counts as unfair
prejudice. If the underlying substantive issues are not handled with
care, then the balancing test breaks down, and removing the word
“substantially” does nothing to fix the problem. Minnesota courts
do not carefully analyze the various competing inferences at stake.
As a result, they approve propensity inferences under the guise of
Spreigl evidence, and the propensity inference ends up weighed on
the wrong side of the scale.
In the Spreigl decision itself, the Minnesota Supreme Court
recognized substantial problems with the character evidence rule,
but rather than addressing the substantive issues, it sought a
204
procedural solution.
The court and the Advisory Committee
have continued to pursue the same strategy ever since. They have
provided heightened procedural protections, but they have left the
substantive doctrines of admissibility untouched. The result is that
evidence of uncharged misconduct is broadly admissible in
Minnesota criminal cases despite the procedural safeguards. The
procedural safeguards are certainly well-intentioned, and perhaps
they are sensible on the merits, but they do nothing to address the
legal fictions that dominate the Spreigl doctrine. The focus on
procedure may even be affirmatively harmful in that it distracts
courts from the more important substantive issues.
III. THE FUTURE: A CANDID POLICY DEBATE
The current Spreigl doctrine in Minnesota is not very sensible.
Courts admit evidence to prove 404(b) purposes, but because they
do not carefully examine the routes of relevance, they allow
201.
202.
203.
204.

FED. R. EVID. 403; MINN. R. EVID. 403.
MINN. R. EVID. 404(b).
See id. advisory committee cmt. (2006).
State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 493–97, 139 N.W.2d 167, 171–73 (1965).
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propensity inferences in many such cases. In one sense, that
confusion is an understandable result of the history of the
character evidence rule, which at least in Minnesota, does not
reveal a clear stance on the propensity inference. But while history
provides some explanation, it does not provide any justification for
continued failings. In light of the character rule’s modern
rationale, and in light of the nearly uniform teaching of evidence
law authorities, Minnesota’s doctrine makes little sense.
It could be, however, that the decisions of Minnesota courts
are not a reflection of any confusion regarding the rule, but are
instead a reflection of a policy disagreement regarding the rule.
Despite the lofty aspirations that underlie the character evidence
rule, it is not universally admired. Legislatures around the country
have chipped away at the rule, creating explicit exceptions for sex
205
Many other legal systems
crimes and certain other offenses.
206
operate without any character evidence ban, and some scholars
207
have called for its repeal. Their arguments are not without force.
Courts’ willingness to allow disguised propensity evidence might
reflect their tacit agreement with the rule’s critics.
Before deciding whether and how to fix Minnesota’s Spreigl
doctrine, then, it is necessary to decide whether to have a character
evidence rule at all. The policy question is primary. It is time for
that question to be presented and debated openly.
The rule should not be maintained for tradition’s sake. The
tradition is both less old and less sensible than many believe. The
rule should not be maintained simply to draw a line of separation

205. See FED. R. EVID. 413–15; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1108–09; see also FISHER, supra
note 10, at 208 (listing eight jurisdictions that have created explicit exceptions to
the character evidence rule for sex crimes).
206. See generally Mirjan R. Damaska, Propensity Evidence in Continental Legal
Systems, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 (1994); see also Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary
Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 464 (1992).
207. David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and
Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 35 (1994); Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character
Evidence Rule Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1547, 1620–26 (1998); H. Richard Uviller,
Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 890 (1982) (arguing that “character evidence cannot and
should not be banished from the field of proof”). The Justice Department has
also campaigned against the rule. See Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney
General on the Admission of Criminal Histories at Trial, ‘Truth in Criminal Justice’ Report
No. 4, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 708 (1989); William P. Barr, Attorney General, U.S.
Dept. Justice, Recommendations for State Criminal Justice Systems, 51 CRIM. L. REP.
2315, 2326 (1992) (Recommendation 13).

1406

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:4
208

between Anglo-American and Continental systems of justice.
Continental legal systems might be correct in their approach to this
particular problem, and in any event, it can no longer be seriously
maintained that our criminal justice system is more protective of
209
criminal defendants than European systems.
The rule should be maintained only if it promotes accuracy in
criminal adjudications. If the system would reach accurate
resolutions of guilt or innocence more often without the character
evidence rule, then it should be scrapped. Abolishing the rule
would presumably lead to more convictions—convictions in cases
that would produce acquittals without propensity evidence. Some
of those convictions would be inaccurate, but some would be
accurate.
The framework of the cost-benefit analysis is straightforward.
The benefit of abolishing the rule would be a reduction in false
210
The
negatives; the cost would be an increase in false positives.
ultimate cost-benefit analysis rests on two underlying judgments:
(1) an empirical judgment about what ratio of reduced false
negatives to increased false positives the rule’s abolition would
produce, and (2) a normative judgment about what ratio would
make such a change worthwhile.
Those judgments are not easily made. Empirical data about
211
the former judgment will be difficult or impossible to come by. It
may be, therefore, that the outcome of the debate will ultimately
212
Blackstone said “it
depend on the latter moral-normative point.
is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
208. See WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 194, at 233 (stating that the character rule
“represents a revolution in the theory of criminal trials, and is one of the peculiar
features, of vast moment, which distinguishes the Anglo-American from the
Continental system of evidence”); Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 432 (“The rule
distinguishes our criminal justice system from both Continental and totalitarian
legal systems.”).
209. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
210. See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009).
211. Testing the accuracy-producing benefits of various rules is extremely
difficult in part because designing and running effective jury simulations is
difficult. See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the
Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75 (1999); Shari Seidman Diamond,
Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561 (1997).
212. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413
(1999) (arguing that though policy debates are often framed in empirical terms,
underlying normative and moral judgments tend to drive the debates).
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213

suffer,” but reasonable people can disagree about whether ten-to214
Reasonable people can likewise disagree
one is the right ratio.
about whether it makes sense to maintain the character evidence
rule. But it is a debate worth having. And it is a debate worth
215
having candidly, in an open fashion, rather than in the hidden
and somewhat duplicitous common law fashion where courts
216
fashion a rule and then habitually ignore it.
It is a debate best suited for the legislature. The judiciary has
no special institutional competence that makes it best suited for the
empirical and moral judgments that drive the cost-benefit analysis
217
The debate will depend on balancing a variety
described above.
of competing considerations, and it will depend heavily on
assessments of societal values—it is precisely the sort of debate
218
Balancing all of the
better handled by legislatures than courts.
competing considerations, the legislature could decide to repeal
Rule 404. It could decide to maintain it. Or it could seek a
compromise solution, such as repealing the rule for sex crimes
cases but maintaining it for others, as the Federal Rules currently
219
As a policy matter, each possible outcome is arguably
do.
213. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
214. Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997).
215. Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296, 296–97 (1990); Paul
Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 666–68 (1983); David L. Shapiro,
In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 736–38 (1987).
216. See John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1209,
1223 (2006) (noting that “the law clings to the rules purporting to exclude other
crimes and character evidence, despite their almost total negation in practice . . .
.”).
217. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to
Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347 (1994) (outlining a theory of comparative
institutional competence).
218. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 981 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (“[I]f such a decision requires the resolution of so
many difficult policy questions, many of them beyond the normal compass of a
single case or controversy such as those with which the courts regularly deal,
doesn’t that decision smack of legislation more than adjudication?”); In re Grand
Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1154–55 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Congress is able to consider, for
example, society’s moral, sociological, economic, religious and other values
without being confined to the evidentiary record in any particular case.”).
219. See FED. R. EVID. 413 (admitting evidence of prior sex crimes against
defendants charged with sex crimes); see also Sherry F. Colb, “Whodunit” Versus
“What Was Done”: When to Admit Character Evidence in Criminal Cases, 79 N.C. L. REV.
939 (2001) (arguing “that different categories of criminal cases . . . call for distinct
rules regarding propensity evidence”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the
Task of Reforming the American Character Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting
the Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 301–02 (1995)
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justifiable.
The current case law, in its substantially incoherent form,
would benefit from legislative guidance. Of course, courts might
bristle at legislative intervention. The Minnesota Supreme Court
has stated in the past that the creation of rules of evidence is a
quintessentially judicial function, and that the court retains
inherent authority to ignore or strike down legislative
220
Such claims of judicial supremacy over evidence
intervention.
221
law are somewhat dubious even in the abstract.
But especially in
this instance, where the Minnesota Supreme Court has so often
issued decisions weakening the rule, it could hardly complain if the
legislature delivered a final blow of outright repeal.
As it is currently enforced by Minnesota courts, the character
evidence rule is not worth having. If the propensity inference is
allowed to prove all “other purposes” such as intent and identity,
then Rule 404 serves no purpose. Either the fictions of the current
doctrine should be abandoned, or the pretense of the rule itself
222
should be abandoned. Which course is best is debatable, but it is
a debate worth having, and worth having candidly.
(arguing for experimental partial repeals of the character evidence rule).
220. State v. Gianakos, 644 N.W.2d 409, 416 n.10 (Minn. 2002) (“While we
acknowledge that the legislature has taken steps to limit the power of the court
with respect to certain evidentiary issues, . . . it is clear that the judicial branch has
ultimate and final authority in such matters.”); see also State v. Johnson, 514
N.W.2d 551, 553–54 (Minn. 1994); State v. Larson, 453 N.W.2d 42, 46 n.3 (Minn.
1990).
221. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1432 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e
must recognize that Congress has the ultimate power over the enactment of rules
[of evidence] . . . .”); Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court
Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 888–89
(1999); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015, 1022 (1982); see also Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence]
Rulemaking”, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (2002) (discussing various views of comparative
institutional competence for the creation of evidence law).
Rosanna Cavallaro has recently argued (responding to Congress’s enactment of
Federal Rules 413–15) that questions regarding the admission of character
evidence are generally best handled by the judiciary rather than the legislature.
Rosanna Cavallaro, Criminal Law: Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 and the Struggle for
Rulemaking Preeminence, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31 (2007). Even Professor
Cavallaro concedes, however, (contrary to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s view)
that the “debate is best understood not as one of constitutional power but of
prudence.” Id. at 39 n.27.
222. See Reed, supra note 117, at 250–51 (“It is time to admit that in the real
world of the criminal prosecutions, the prosecutor will be able to prove relevant
specific instances of the accused’s uncharged misconduct by employing the ‘magic
words’ vocabulary of Rule 404(b) . . . .”).
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Then again, perhaps candor is overrated.
Potemkin villages
have a purpose, after all—they are meant to reassure. The Spreigl
doctrine may lack logic and rigor, but it may be functionally useful
precisely because it shrouds and buries the difficult policy debate
about the character evidence rule. With Spreigl in place, we can
pretend to maintain the lofty ideals of the character evidence rule
while still convicting and caging the men whose malign
propensities make their guilt (or at least their dangerousness)
more obvious. The legal fictions of current law allow us to avoid
hard choices, and for that reason, they are unlikely to disappear.

223. See Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1307 (1995).

